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areas in the EEZ. After having examined the relevant provisions in the LOSC, the article assesses whether State practice might have changed the traditional interpretation of the LOSC creating new rights to regulate shipping. Most of the already abundant literature on Article 234 focuses on a textual interpretation of the said provision and its drafting history. 8 By contrast, little attention has been paid to subsequent practice regarding the application of Article 234. In addition, the article also considers practice outside the Arctic, concluding that irrespective of the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of Article 234, a not insignificant number of States have claimed jurisdiction in their own EEZ beyond the rights granted in the LOSC, and are therefore not in a position to object to extensive jurisdictional claims in the Arctic.
II The Arctic Ocean
There is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic Ocean. In order to avoid possible politically and legally sensitive issues, the present article relies on the definition of "Arctic Waters"
in the new Chapter XIV of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
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Regulation 1 -Definitions 3. Arctic waters mean those waters which are located north of a line from the latitude 58º00΄.0 N and longitude 042º00΄.0 W to latitude 64º37΄.0 N, longitude 035º27΄.0 W and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 67º03΄.9 N, longitude 026º33΄.4 W and thence by a rhumb line to the latitude 70º49΄.56 N and longitude 008º59΄.61 W (Sørkapp, Jan Mayen) and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to 73º31'.6 N and 019º01'.0 E by the Island of Bjørnøya, and thence by a great circle line to the latitude 68º38΄.29 N and longitude 043º23΄.08 E (Cap Kanin Nos) and hence by the northern shore of the Asian Continent eastward to the Bering Strait and thence from the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60º N as far as Il'pyrskiy and following the 60th North parallel eastward as far as and including Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the North American continent as far south as latitude 60º N and thence eastward along parallel of latitude 60º N, to longitude 056º37΄.1 W and thence to the latitude 58º00΄.0 N, longitude 042º00΄.0 W.
The definition establishes an almost perfect circle, with the North Pole at its centre and the boundary of what constitutes Arctic waters running on the 60 th northern parallel. Only at the southern tip of Greenland and in the westerly part of Russia is the circular line interrupted and the
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Arctic waters' boundary defined with reference to specific seas, islands, capes, straits, passages and bays. As such, most of the Arctic waters are within the Arctic Circle (approximately 66.3 o N) and include the coastal waters of the Arctic Five. 10
Regulating Shipping in the Arctic
The Arctic waters, like any other part of the world's oceans, are regulated by the LOSC. Four of the five Arctic coastal States have ratified the LOSC and the US, which has not, generally accepts that the Convention reflects customary international law. 11 In addition, the Arctic waters are subject to a vast array of international treaties. 12 International law applicable to commercial vessels is predominantly found in various treaties adopted within the IMO. Prominent among these are the MARPOL and SOLAS conventions. 13 Until the entry into force of the Polar Code in January 2017, 14 most IMO conventions contained few provisions specific to the Arctic and most provided that the sole responsibility to implement and enforce international standards rested with flag
States. 15 Despite being the world's smallest ocean, the Arctic waters cover some 14.056 million square kilometres, making it almost six times larger than the Mediterranean Sea. 16 Climate change and the resulting rise in temperatures have raised interest in using the Arctic waters for commercial shipping between Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Two routes in particular are garnering substantial interest: (1) along the northern coast of North America (known as the "Northwest Passage"); and (2) around the North Cape and along the north coast of Eurasia and Siberia until the Bering Strait (which includes what is known as the "Northeast Passage" or "Northern Sea Route"). 17 Both passages are surrounded by controversy. According to the official Canadian position, the Northwest Passage lies within Canada's historic internal waters. This claim is contested both
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by the United States and the European Union which protested the drawing of straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic archipelago in 1986. 18 It is the Russian Government's position that parts of the Northern Sea Route lie within Russia's territorial sea and internal waters. 19 
III. The Exclusive Economic Zone
The establishment of the EEZ is a comparatively recent innovation in the law of the sea. The Third UN Conference also produced an agreement on the establishment of the EEZ. 21 The agreement represented a revolutionary development of the international law of the sea, bringing about one third of the world's oceans within coastal States' jurisdiction. 22 The LOSC gave, inter alia, coastal States "sovereign rights" over natural resources within the EEZ, but not sovereignty. 23 Other than providing sovereign rights over natural resources in their EEZ, the LOSC provides an explicit basis, and indeed an obligation, for States to regulate, protect, and preserve the marine environment. 24 The agreement on the EEZ represented a compromise between two competing sets of interests. The first group included States that had staked extensive claims to broad territorial seas
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and fishing zones. 25 The second group was represented by major maritime powers, which while supporting coastal States' right to explore and exploit the natural resources in coastal waters, also wanted to ensure the freedom of navigation. 26 The compromise achieved in Part V of the LOSC reflects the traditional balance that has shaped the law of the sea, viz. the balance between the competing interests of coastal States and major maritime powers. 27 Article 55 of the LOSC defines the EEZ as "an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea", subject to the specific legal regime established in Part V of the LOSC. It further provides that, …the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Thus, the rights of all States -coastal or otherwise -are regulated by the LOSC. This means that the EEZ is neither under the complete sovereignty of coastal States nor part of the high seas. 
Navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zone
Navigational freedom is an essential part of the law of the sea. The LOSC contains various navigational regimes which apply in distinct zones: "innocent passage" through the territorial sea, 29 the "right of transit passage" through international straits, 30 the "right of archipelagic sea lanes passage" in archipelagic waters, 31 and "freedom of navigation" on the high seas. 32 What distinguishes the various forms of navigational rights is the degree of jurisdiction States may exercise over foreign flagged vessels navigating in the different zones.
In relation to the EEZ, the drafters of the LOSC sought to balance the rights of maritime
States in relation to freedom of navigation with the interests of coastal States in regards to the environment and resources in adjacent seascapes. Thus, Article 58 of the LOSC guarantees freedom of navigation:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation… and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to {PAGE } these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships… and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
However, Article 58 also clearly provides that the freedom of navigation in the EEZ is subject to limitations defined in other articles of the LOSC. 33 One such limitation is imposed by Article 58(3) which stipulates that States exercising their rights in the EEZ must "have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State" and that they must comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the LOSC. Similarly, Article 87(2) of the LOSC provides that the freedoms on the high seas shall be exercised with "due regard" for the interests and rights of other States. In addition, foreign flagged ships are subject to coastal States' powers for pollution control, including special powers over environmentally sensitive areas, which include ice-covered areas, as will be explained below.
Pollution Control over Foreign Flagged Ships
Coastal States' jurisdictional powers in the territorial sea are relatively unrestricted, 34 whereas powers within the EEZ are substantially restrained. 35 The scope of costal States' powers for pollution control are elaborated in Part XII of the LOSC, which deals with the prevention of marine pollution from various sources: land-based marine pollution, 36 the dumping of waste, 37 pollution from seabed activities, 38 pollution from the atmosphere, 39 and the most relevant to this study, pollution from vessels. 40 Article 211(5) of the LOSC states that coastal States:
…may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.
It follows that all laws regulating pollution of foreign flagged vessels in the EEZ must conform to and give effect to generally accepted international rules and standards, commonly adopted via the IMO.
41

{PAGE }
Enforcement jurisdiction is also limited. Physical inspection of foreign flagged vessels in the EEZ may only occur where a vessel has refused to give information relevant to pollution control, or if the information supplied is manifestly at variance with the evident factual situation.
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There must, moreover, be "clear grounds" for believing that a vessel has committed a violation resulting in a "substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine environment".
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A coastal State may only take enforcement measures where there is "clear objective evidence" that a vessel has committed a violation resulting in a discharge causing "major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State" or "to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone". 44 Thus, unless a vessel calls into one of its ports, a coastal State can only interfere with the navigation of a foreign vessel in its EEZ where significant pollution or major damage to the environment has occurred or is threatened.
Coastal States have no explicit authority in the LOSC to take preventative measures. 45 There are two exceptions to the general requirement that coastal States' environmental legislation targeting the EEZ must conform to international standards. The first exception concerns ecologically sensitive areas and the second concerns ice-covered areas.
In ecologically sensitive areas within their EEZ, coastal States may, in accordance with Article 211(6) of the LOSC, adopt special measures where international rules and standards are "inadequate to meet special circumstances". However, the establishment of such special measures requires prior consultation through a "competent international organization" (i.e. the IMO), as well as consultation with any concerned State. 46 As no State has ever made use of this provision, it is currently of a more academic than practical interest.
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It follows that coastal States' power to protect and preserve the marine environment in the EEZ is limited. States, for example, could not generally ban the movement of hazardous waste or prevent navigation by certain vessels, such as oil tankers. 48 Thus, while the LOSC contains detailed rules providing coastal States with legislative jurisdiction to protect against pollution, they cannot, except for very limited circumstances, interfere with the navigational rights of foreign flagged vessels. 49 The only possible exception is in ice-covered areas.
(a) Ice-Covered Areas
Ice-covered areas are subject to a special legal regime. In ice-covered areas, coastal States may, in accordance with Article 234, adopt and enforce non-discriminatory environmental laws that are stricter than general international standards. This was a unique development of the law of the sea, initiated by Canada and negotiated during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea with the Soviet Union and the US, with little interest or opposition shown by other States. 50 The negotiations were chiefly driven by the Canadian government, which was trying to achieve international support for its 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, under which Canada unilaterally claimed competence to regulate pollution out to 100 nautical miles from its shore. 51 This underlying aim was explicitly recognised by the US, which stated that the purpose of Article 234 was to "provide the basis for implementing the provisions applicable to commercial and private vessels found in the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollutions Prevention Act". 52 Unlike Canada, which was mainly interested in environmental protection, the United
States' and the Soviet Union's main interest was freedom of navigation. 53 The resulting provision was yet another compromise which, although it ostensibly concerns all ice-covered areas, is "really only about the Arctic Ocean."
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Article 234 provides coastal States with the "right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels", without any procedural requirements or need for prior consultation. 55 At the same time, Article 234 is restricted and only applies to:
…ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
Furthermore, any laws or regulations adopted pursuant to Article 234 must have "due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence".
The wording of Article 234 reflects a delicate balance between competing priorities and as a result, its interpretation is shrouded in uncertainty: it has in fact been described as "probably the to the EEZ, excluding the territorial sea. 57 Another includes the territorial sea, straits and, so far as relevant, internal waters. 58 The second interpretation seems contrary to Article 55 of the LOSC, which defines the EEZ as the area "beyond and adjacent to" the territorial sea, but it does promote desirable consistency as it would allow States to apply the same standards to both their territorial seas and their EEZ. 59 In contrast, if Article 234 does not apply to the territorial sea, it leads to the anomalous result that coastal States have greater powers to regulate shipping in ice-covered areas of their EEZ than in ice-covered areas of their territorial sea.
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There is, moreover, no common definition of "ice-covered areas" or indeed any of the various cumulative conditions that must be fulfilled before Article 234 applies, such as "severe climatic conditions", ice-cover for "most of the year", or "obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation", all of which are open to interpretation.
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There is also significant uncertainty as to how far Article 234 allows coastal States to limit the freedom of navigation, with some views almost diametrically opposed. Some scholars take a 
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IV. Practice by the Arctic Five
Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding Article 234, most States seem to accept that it is lex specialis in respect of coastal States' jurisdiction in Arctic waters. 64 How far the scope of their jurisdiction extends is, however, controversial and the wording of Article 234 is unclear.
Numerous scholars have sought to clarify the meaning of Article 234, but little consensus exists. 65 It seems futile to add to the already abundant literature seeking to find the "true" meaning of Article 234 by way of a textual interpretation. Instead, the remainder of this article will focus on State practice.
It is a well-established principle that subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as a reflection of the parties' agreement regarding its interpretation, can be taken into account when interpreting the terms of a specific provision. The principle is recognised both in treaty and customary international law. 66 As every application of a treaty presupposes some interpretation of its provisions, practice may reflect the original intention of the parties, and thus aid in its interpretation, or it may reflect a subsequent consensus among the parties concerning the meaning of a specific provision.
A subsequent consensus may even override the original meaning of the drafters. 67 This outcome, however, is controversial and while some international tribunals have occasionally confirmed that subsequent practice may lead to a modification of the express terms of a treaty, the How much practice is needed is uncertain, but the ICJ and most other international tribunals have been flexible in their approach. 72 The ILC has suggested that:
Subsequent practice under article 31(3)(b) can take a variety of forms and must reflect a common understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty. Its value as a means of interpretation depends on the extent to which it is concordant, common and consistent. 73 The formula "concordant, common and consistent" does not establish a minimum threshold but the extent to which subsequent practice complies with the formula may reveal a discernible pattern and thus the agreement of the parties. 74 Accordingly, the ILC has found that "the value of subsequent practice varies depending on how far it shows the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms." 75 The tribunal established pursuant to the LOSC in the South China Sea Arbitration stated that ICJ decisions confirm that the "threshold for accepting an agreement on the interpretation by State practice is quite high." 76 Gardiner writes that the practice must be "concordant", that is, identical or sufficiently identical so as to demonstrate the parties' agreement. 77 He further states that this does not necessarily mean that there has been abundant practice by all parties to a treaty, but rather that the practice of one or two States suffices if there is good evidence that other parties have endorsed the practice. 78 Similarly, Aust writes that although it is not necessary to show that each party has engaged in a practice, all must have accepted it, even if tacitly. requiring prior notification and authorisation for entry into their respective EEZ. 83 The following section provides an overview of the practice of the Arctic Five regulating shipping in the EEZ.
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Canada
Canadian Arctic environmental legislation not only predates, but was also a major catalyst for the adoption Article 234. 84 The 1969 voyage of the American oil tanker, the Manhattan, through the
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Northwest Passage created a "groundswell of opposition" within Canada and focused attention on the Arctic. 85 This focus, combined with an increased environmental awareness, led to the adoption of the 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act. 86 The Act applied to zones extending 100 nautical miles from Canadian islands north of the 60 th northern parallel and banned the discharge of all waste by vessels. It also regulated their design, construction and navigation within designated zones.
The extension of legislative jurisdiction over the Arctic waters was clearly inconsistent with the then-existing legal regime and the US promptly objected on the grounds that:
International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction. We are concerned that this action by Canada if not opposed by us, would be taken as a precedent in other parts of the world for other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas. If Canada had the right to claim and exercise exclusive pollution and resource jurisdiction on the high seas, other countries could assert the right to exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some reasonable and some not, but all equally invalid according to international law. 87 The United States was the only State to formally object and the principle that coastal States are entitled to exercise legislative jurisdiction over ice-covered waters outside but adjacent to their territorial sea was eventually accepted and, as explained above, included in Article 234 of the LOSC.
In 2009, Canada amended the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and extended the reach of its pollution regulation from 100 to 200 nautical miles, 88 thus covering the entire Canadian EEZ in the Arctic. 89 In addition, the previously voluntary vessel reporting system, NORDREG, was made mandatory in 2010. 90 Under the new scheme, large non-governmental vessels are subject to a mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation. 91 The system also applies to any vessel that transports pollutants or dangerous goods, regardless of size.
report can be requested to leave Canadian waters and noncompliance is punishable by criminal sanctions and the possible detention of the vessel. 93 The notification and authorisation system applies to all Canadian "Arctic waters", which are defined in the amended Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act as:
…the internal waters of Canada and the waters of the territorial sea of Canada and the exclusive economic zone of Canada, within the area enclosed by the 60th parallel of north latitude, the 141st meridian of west longitude and the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone… 94 The Act takes into account Canada's contentious claim to straight baselines around the islands that comprise the Canadian archipelago. 95 The definition includes various routes connecting the Beaufort Sea to the Davis Strait.
Canada has justified its mandatory NORDREG system with reference to Article 234. In a formal submission to the IMO Safety Commission, Canada asserted, inter alia, that Article 234
provided "a complete legal justification in international law for NORDREG." 96 Two States and international shipping organisations have objected to the mandatory notification and authorisation requirement. 97 As noted by the ILC, the conduct of non-State actors, such as international shipping organisations, does not constitute subsequent practice under Articles 31 of the VCLT, but may, nonetheless, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of state parties. 98 The reaction of state parties is, however, paramount.
The two States that have unequivocally objected to NORDREG are the US and Singapore.
The US has stated that whilst it supports the navigational safety and environmental protection objectives of NORDREG, it considers the mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation to be:
…a sweeping infringement of freedom of navigation within the exclusive economic zone and the right of innocent passage within the territorial sea, both of which are bedrock principles of the law of the sea. 99 Singapore has stated that:
…it is not apparent how the mandatory ship reporting… ties in with the fundamental purpose of Article 234… which is to allow for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. The US and a group of European States subsequently issued a communication insisting that laws and regulations enacted on the basis of Article 234 must have "due regard to navigation" and be based on the best available scientific evidence. 102 Whether Article 234 provides sufficient legal basis for NORDREG is still fiercely debated. 103 One feature that seems especially difficult to reconcile with Article 234 is the indiscriminate application of NORDREG above the 60 th northern parallel, regardless of ice-cover, climatic conditions or conditions of navigation. Thus it seems fair to conclude that Canadian state practice supports a de maximis reading of Article 234, although this reading has been criticised both by the US and Singapore, as well as by international shipping organisations.
Russia
In 2012, Russia adopted a new regulation governing shipping in the Arctic. 104 The new regulation amended the existing legal framework dating from the Soviet era. 105 The purpose of the 2012 amendment was, inter alia, to improve environmental regulation in line with Article 234. 106 The explanatory note to the new legislation explicitly invokes Article 234, stating that:
The available Rules of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route approved by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR on September 14, 1990 , are consistent with the requirements of Clause 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 that empowers the coastal states to adopt and provide observance of the nondiscriminatory laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from the vessels in the regions within the exclusive economic zone covered with ice for the most of the year. 107 The explanatory note further states that the situation in the Arctic has changed dramatically since the Rules of Navigation in the Northern Sea Route were first approved and that the new rules provide an updated contemporary legal framework based on Article 234. 108 The Russian regulations apply to the "Northern Sea Route", which is defined in Article 
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In 2013, Russia also adopted the "Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea". 111 The new rules establish rights and prerogatives that go beyond the existing legal framework. 112 Similar to NORDREG, the Russian scheme subjects foreign flagged shipping to a mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation before entering the Russian EEZ.
Although the stated aim of the new rules is to ensure "safe navigation and protection of the marine environment," Russian practice does not always seem to support this goal. 113 In 2013, for example, the Arctic Sunrise was denied access to the Northern Sea Route as part of Greenpeace's operation "Save the Arctic", which sought to stop offshore oil drilling and industrial fishing in Arctic waters. As part of its operation, Greenpeace wanted to stage a protest at the Russian offshore oil platform Prirazlomnaya, located within the Russian EEZ. Greenpeace made several unsuccessful applications for authorisation to enter Russia's EEZ. In replying to the fourth application, the Russian authorities made explicit reference to Article 234. 114 The Arctic Sunrise subsequently entered the Russian EEZ without authorisation and staged a protest near the Prirazlomnaya platform, with two activists managing to reach the platform itself. In response, the Arctic Sunrise was boarded by the Russian authorities and the crew detained.
The detention led to several protests, including by the Netherlands, the flag State of the Arctic Sunrise. A Dutch Minister declared that "Article 234… is no license to inhibit the freedom of navigation without restrictions." 115 The case was brought before an arbitral tribunal constituted under annex VII of the LOSC. The tribunal was not satisfied that the "boarding, seizure, and detention of the Arctic Sunrise constituted enforcement in accordance with Article 234", although this conclusion was based on factual circumstances and not an interpretation of the LOSC. 116 This and other incidents do, however, show that the Russian authorities have become less tolerant of vessels sailing in their EEZ without prior authorisation.
de maximis interpretation of Article 234, whereas the reaction of the Netherlands seems to suggest that Article 234 does not provide an unfettered right to interfere with the freedom of navigation.
Denmark/Greenland
118
Denmark was one of the few States that spoke on record at the Third Law of the Sea Conference on the importance of Article 234, but it has not adopted any special legislation for ice-covered areas. 119 In 2002, Denmark introduced a mandatory vessel reporting system known as GREENPOS applicable to the Arctic waters around Greenland. 120 Unlike the Canadian or Russian schemes, there is no requirement of prior authorization for entering the EEZ, but all ships on voyages to or from Greenlandic ports and places of call are required to report. A failure to do so can be punished with a fine or imprisonment. 121 The rules are adopted in accordance with SOLAS regulation V/8-1. 122 Denmark's Arctic strategy states that it will work to establish global rules and standards for navigation in the Arctic via the IMO. 123 The strategy further provides:
Should it prove that agreement on global rules cannot be reached, and in view of the especially vulnerable Arctic environment and the unique challenges of security, the Kingdom will consider implementing non-discriminatory regional safety and environmental rules for navigation in the Arctic in consultation with the other Arctic states and taking into account international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions regarding navigation in ice covered waters.
The statement clearly refers to Article 234, although it does not impose a requirement for prior consultation. The reference could also be taken to mean that Denmark has reserved its right to rely on Article 234 at a later stage, although there is no need for this type of formal notice. 
Norway/Svalbard
Norway has not adopted any special legislation for ice-covered areas in its maritime zones. This can partly be explained by the fact that large parts of Norway's Arctic waters are not ice-covered for most of the year. Article 234 is therefore inapplicable, although Canada and Russia's broad exercise of legislative jurisdiction in their respective EEZ seems to suggest that the requirement has been interpreted generously. The lack of Norwegian regulation could therefore indicate a disagreement over the interpretation of Article 234 or simply a lack of interest. Another possible reason for the lack of legislation is that Norway's maritime boundaries and jurisdiction over its Arctic waters have been disputed for decades, particularly near the Svalbard archipelago, which is located far north of the 60 th northern parallel. 127 The 1920 Spitsbergen (today known as "Svalbard") Treaty established Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. 128 Norway claims that the treaty does not affect its rights beyond the territorial sea around Svalbard. 129 But several parties have contradicted this claim. 130 Although it has encouraged States holding different views to go to the ICJ, Norway has largely refrained from challenging any contradictory claims. 131 Thus in 1976 when Norway established an EEZ off its mainland it did not include Svalbard. 132 One explanation for Norway's restraint is it longs standing policy of maintaining of peace and stability in the area. 
The United States 134
As noted initially, the US has not ratified the LOSC and can therefore only rely on Article 234 as the legal basis for its legislative jurisdiction if it reflects customary international law, which is {PAGE } accepted by the US. 135 It is not, however, entirely clear how a provision that was negotiated by three States, with little interest shown by other States, and which has only been applied by Canada and Russia can have generated enough practice to satisfy the general requirements for the establishment of customary international law. 136 Especially as Canada is the only State that had established a clear practice before becoming party to the LOSC, a significant fact given that the importance of subsequent practice remains theoretically unclear. 137 In addition, the US position with regard to Article 234, has been somewhat inconsistent and ambiguous. 138 Unlike Canada and Russia, however, the US has not established a system of prior notification and authorisation for entering its EEZ. The US is, moreover, unlikely to do so as it would be inconsistent with its objections to the Canadian NORDREG scheme, as well as with its long established Freedom of Navigation Program, initiated in 1979 inter alia to preserve and protect global navigation rights. 139 The US is sometimes accused of having passed as equally far-reaching legislation as Canada and Russia, often with reference to the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (OPA), which was adopted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. 140 Brubaker, for instance, writes that while Russian and US laws are not directly comparable (because Russia has a formal system for prior notification and authorisation), the US system "clearly has procedures for determining authorised passage upon sufficient proof of financial security." 141 He continues:
Under the OPA, if a foreign vessel cannot prove financial security, then denial of clearance into the USA or US navigable waters, detention at the place where the lack of evidence is discovered, and seizure and forfeiture with US navigable waters may result. 142 Brubaker refers to the Certificate of Financial Responsibility, issued by the National Pollution
Funds Center of the US Coast Guard. 143 A certificate is required by all vessels over 300 gross tons calling into US ports. 144 The requirement also applies to foreign flagged vessel that use the EEZ
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to "transship or lighter oil destined for a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States", which includes, but is not limited to, ports. 145 In the latter case, a certificate is required both by the vessel that receives the oil as well as by the vessel that delivers it, although the latter may not visit a US port. Molenaar has referred to the requirement as a "very extensive and unusual exercise of port State jurisdiction", which arguably constitutes an "unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States in the exercise of their rights" pursuant to the LOSC Article 194(4). 146 Even though the US regime established by the OPA is broader and more comprehensive than the international regime established under the auspices of the IMO, it is not as far reaching as either the Canadian or Russian laws applicable in the Arctic. 147 Firstly, the OPA only applies to vessels that have a clear connection with the US, either by being destined, or cooperating with another vessel destined, for a place subject to US sovereignty. 148 Thus vessels merely transiting through the American EEZ are not affected. Secondly, the exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the US may also be supported by traditional bases of jurisdiction, such as the territorial principle (via the effects doctrine) or the protective principle. 149 The application of the effects doctrine to vessels that have not yet reached port is controversial, but not uncommon. Various States have made extensive claims restricting navigation in the EEZ. Some States have asserted that they have a right to be informed of planned voyages carrying ultra-hazardous cargo, such as nuclear material. 155 India, for example, requires 24-hour advance notice before vessels carrying hazardous and dangerous goods can transit through its EEZ. 156 Other States maintain that they have not only a right to be informed, but that they can also deny passage of such cargo through their EEZ. 157 The controversy concerning the advance notification requirement is reflected in freedom of navigation in the EEZ. 160 The LOSC contains no provision that allows coastal States to regulate the transport of goods through the EEZ per se and such restrictions are therefore difficult to reconcile with the Convention. 161 Kraska writes that as a result of coastal States pressing for stronger environmental regulations on foreign flagged ships in the EEZ, many States are now reluctant to exercise their rights to transport nuclear material. 162 It is not only ultra-hazardous cargo that is being limited. After the Prestige oil spill in 2002, Spain, France and Portugal banned single hulled oil tankers from their EEZ. 163 At the time, these measures were stricter than the international standards and incompatible with the LOSC. 164 Other
States have gone even further. One of the most extreme cases is the Maldives, which requires prior authorisation for any foreign flagged vessel to enter its EEZ, regardless of its cargo. 165 Many other
States have made extensive claims of jurisdiction and at least five States -Barbados, Guyana, India, Mauritius and Pakistan -claim the right to extend any law in force within their territorial sea to the EEZ. 166 Burma claims rights and jurisdiction for the construction, maintenance or operation of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and other structures and devices necessary for the exploration of its natural resources, which is permitted under the LOSC, but also, for the convenience of shipping, or for any other purpose. 167 Grenada, Guyana, India, Mauritius, Pakistan and the Seychelles claim similar rights. Imposing a strict obligation to protest would also arguably place too onerous a burden upon State parties, forcing them to constantly monitor a great number of multilateral treaties.
VII. Conclusion
There is obviously some controversy concerning the right to regulate shipping in the Arctic. Article 234 is unclear and neither the drafting history nor subsequent practice in the application of the provision establishes much clarity regarding its interpretation. 182 Currently, however, these options have only been used by the US and Singapore. A more likely option is a jurisdictional "battle", which refers to the confrontation of competing claims, for instance by the exercise of legislative or enforcement jurisdiction, such as such as those by Canada and the US. At times, opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction will lead the legislating State to withdraw or modify its claim. At other times, the objecting State has to accept the new claim, as was the case with the United States and Article 234, which sought to preserve the freedom of navigation.
The battle over the Arctic has arguably been raging for decades if not centuries, but the battleground is changing. 183 Climate change has increased the interest in Arctic shipping and in
Article 234, but it may also decrease the importance of the latter. If ice-cover in the Arctic is reduced as a result of global climate change to the extent that is widely predicted, many parts of Arctic EEZ will no longer be covered with ice for "most of the year" and thus the Arctic coastal
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States will no longer be able to rely on Article 234. 184 When this may happen is still uncertain and it does not satisfactorily explain why so many States seem disinclined to make a clear statement on the appropriate reach of Article 234. 
